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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 3 SPRING, 1965 NUMBER 2
OF LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM IN AMERICAN
CRIMINAL LAW*
Gerhard 0. W. Muellert
INTRODUCTION
Continental scholars traditionally have been preoccupied with the
creation of theories about existing and emerging phenomena, and
since these theories became identified with their creators and fore-
most proponents, the custom has emerged of focusing much of the
scholarly writing on these theories and, of necessity, on their spokes-
men. Thus, continental criminal law scholarship in theoretical, yet
personal. American scholarship has not yet quite reached that
point; it is not similarly focused on theories and their spokesmen, but
deals with issues. In short, and with a bit of exaggeration, European
scholars of criminal law talk to and about each other and each other's
theories. American criminal-law scholars talk past each other and
about the raw stuff from which useful theories can be constructed.
Yet, in at least one respect, it has become rather customary among
* Based on a paper delivered at Claremont College, California, 1963.
t Castle of Ploen College, Germany, abitur, 1946; Kiel University Faculty
of Law, student, two years; University of Chicago, Doctor of Law, 1953; Columbia
University, Master of Law, 1955. Professor of Law, New York University; Vice-
President, International Association of Penal Law.
Editor's Note: This is the first of a four part Criminal Law Symposium which
is dedicated by its authors to the memory of the late Professor
Paul W. Tappan, whom the world of criminology lost too soon.
The remaining articles which will appear in the next three suc-
cessive issues are: German Criminal Law And Its Reform by
Horst Schr6der; Arrest, Prosecution And Police Power In The
Federal Republic Of Germany by Cyril D. Robinson; and The
Principle Of Harm In The Concept Of Crime by Albin Eser.
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American criminal-law academicians, though only in recent years, to
size each other up by extrinsic standards. This may be a first indica-
tion of a move in the continental direction. These extrinsic standards,
however, are those running parallel to contemporary practical poli-
tics. In a nation as political in orientation as ours, this "sizing up,"
with a consequent theoretical grouping, is in terms of one's standing
on issues of current public-political concern. As politicians are being
rated and grouped in accordance with their standing on such issues
as medical care for the aged, foreign aid, income taxation, or the
public school system, criminal-law academicians are similarly being
rated and grouped in accordance with their standing on such issues
as their approach to juvenile delinquency, the capacity issue, police
powers, capital punishment, and so on. Actually, since criminal law
is of so much concern to those outside the closed circle of academi-
cians, every scholar does risk a rating and grouping with anything he
may utter or publish, on any issue within his domain. Not that it
should not be that way! Quite to the contrary, there is something
wholesome about such a concern with the views of one's contempo-
raries. Perhaps we may even reach the point at which we can size
up-each other's theories directly rather than in terms of academical
relatively insignificant groupings of political import.
In any event, the groupings are those of practical politics, namely,"
in terms of liberalism and conservatism. It is not to be expected that
criminal law scholars consciously adopt either a liberal or a conserva-
tive position on any issue they are about to discuss. Some may do so,
some may not. But it is certainly plausible that whatever criminal-
law academicians may say, should also be evaluated in terms of its
implications to society. After all, the perusal of society's police
power constitutes the most direct and most far-reaching of all antago-
nisms of man's freedom.
There is not a single instance in the field of penal law in which the
question of one's Weltanschauung does not arise. Every time organ-
ized man proposes to increase the onus upon himself as an individual,
in an effort of making more secure what is left of his indiVidual free-
dom,1 he asks himself the questionof the weighting of the scales-in
1. Chief Parker of the Los Angeles Police has expressed the dilemma in
these terms:
If society chooses, for reasons of-its own, to handicap itself so severely
that it cannot or will not deal effectively with'the criminal army, it is
doubtful that free society as we-now enjoy it will continue; for either
crime will increase until there is no internal security worthy of that
name, or the police force will be so expanded that the crushing financial
and moral burden of a police state will be here whether we like it or not.
Parker, Surveillance by Wiretapping or Dictograph: Threat or Protection?, 42
Calif. L. Rev. 727, 728 (1954).
[Vol. 3: p. 137
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favor of freedom or in favor of restrainti in favor of "society" or in
favor of the "individual." But is man really in the same position as
the merchant who seeks to bring his scale into balance by adding a bit
on -this side or subtracting a bit on the other?
Since it is plainly impossible to re-examine the entire field of crim-
inal law, it is here proposed to take from the four spheres into which
penal law, for the sake of convenience, is customarily divided, a
single question for examination of positions taken in point on the
necessity of the bridle which democratic man, in the exercise of his
self-policing power, has attached to himself.2
I have selected for each of the four spheres a specific question which
is familiar enough to most criminal lawyers, on which an abundance
of authority de lege lata and de lege ferenda, exists, on which both
liberals and conservatives have taken a stand, yet on which agree-
ment does not exist. I have, moreover, endeavored to select for each
sphere an issue which is relatively typical and demonstrative of most
other issues in that sphere, yet one which also has a relevant contact
with the behavioral sciences, and which has aroused the interest of
writers other than those from the inner circle of academia.3
2. Namely: Criminal law-the general part; criminal law-the special
part; criminal law administration; criminology.
3. It is impossible, within the confines of this paper, to attempt a full
documentation on each of the issues, nor can they be discussed in detail. On pre-
vious occasions I have discussed three of the four issues in greater detail though
not from the instant perspective. Readers with a desire for further information
are referred to the following previously published articles which, for the sake of
simplicity, will not be cited again in this chapter:
(1) Mueller, M'Naghten Remains Irreplaceable: Recent Events in .
the Law of Incapacity, 50 Geo. L.J. 105 (1961); Psycho-Pathologie et
"Pdchydermologie," 16 (n.s.) Revue de Sc. Crim. et de Droit Pen. Comp.
535 (1961); The Failure o Concepts of Criminal Theory in.Judging the-
Psychopathic Offender, Archives of. Crim. Psychodyn, Spec. Psycho-
pathy Issue 558 (1961); Ii fallimento delle concezioni della teoria
criminale nel giudiciare il delinquente psicopatico, 3 Quaderni di Crimi-
nologia Clinica 195 (1961); Irreconcilability of Guilt Concepts, 5 (2) J.
Off. Ther. 1 (1961).
(2) Equal Injustice Under Law, 10 (1) Challenge 6 (1961), also
(sub. tit. Am bushed Businessmen), Wall Street Journal, Oct. 23, 1961,
p. 4; also Maryland Motor Transport News 5 (Feb. 1962); Mueller,
Mens Rea and the Law Without It, 58 W. Va. L. Rev. 34'(1955) ; Mueller,
How to .Increase Traffic Fatilities: A Useful Guide for Modern Legis-
lators and Traffic Courts, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 944 (1960).
(3) Mueller, The Law Relating to Police Interrogation Privileges
(nd Limitations, 52 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 2 (1961), also in POLICEPOWER
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 131 (Sowle ed. 1962); Pieski and Mueller,
Criminal Law .and Administration 1962 Ann. Survey Am. L. 68, 83
(1963).
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Within this examination it shall be my specific objective to investi-
gate the positions customarily labelled as liberal and as conservative
in an effort to determine which group takes which positions and why
and, ultimately, to ascertain the consistency of each group on all four
of the selected issues, as well as the consistency with true liberal and
conservative goals. The terms liberal and conservative themselves
would require an explanatory essay. To avoid this complication, I
shall label those as liberals who label themselves as such. This in-
cludes, for our purposes, those writers who champion the principles
of equal opportunity for all, of freedom from arbitrary state (police)
intervention, with a maximal use of police power to insure these
goals. As "true liberalism" I regard that point of view which seeks
the accomplishment of communal goals with a minimum amount of
state (police) interference with individual freedom, and thus with the
least exertion of effort. The term "conservatism" is hard to define,
since conservatives themselves rarely endeavor to delineate their
policies. I suspect, however, that the conservative, with a general
aversion to state interference with individual freedom, is mostly dis-
tinguishable by his desire to cling to past-and thus, perhaps, proven
practices, even though such practices may amount to an endorsement
of state interventionism with freedom. A "true conservative" may
even look with favor on a patriarchal state which protects its subjects
against their own follies and the depredations of others. "True lib-
erals" and "true conservatives" might have one thing in common:
both would approach any actual or fancied evil with caution and with
a hesitancy to create a new restriction for purposes of eradicating
that evil, expecting that natural forces of whatever sort would solve
the problem, though not ruling out the use of police power if abso-
lutely necessary. The (just plain) liberal, as we shall meet him in
this article, approaches every evil with the presumption, usually
borne by laudable humanitarian considerations, that the use of the
police power is called for in order to eradicate that evil.
CRIMINAL LAW - THE GENERAL PART:
THE ISSUE OF CAPACITY
It is generally agreed that only mentally healthy persons should be
subjected to the penal power of the state. 4 The issue of capacity, or
responsibility, (sometimes crudely labelled "insanity") goes to the
4. Oddly, this does not prevent some lawyers and even doctors from
arguing that the mental defectives ("mad-dog killers") are precisely those
persons who should be subjected to capital punishment. Reference in Weiss,
WHY I FAVOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 7-10 (1961).
[Vol. 3 : p. 137
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very root of the entire penal system. However, there is great conflict
on why that should be so and on what amounts to a sufficient degree
of mental disturbance to constitute incapacity. Traditionally, Anglo-
American law has employed the M'Naghten test 5 which, conceptu-
ally, posits that every crime consists of (a) a relatively free, i.e.,
rational action 6 and (b) a meaningful apperception of the significance
of such act in terms of society's demands.7 A person whose behavior
does not measure up to these standards is incapacitated.
The controversy on the capacity question came clearly into focus
in 1954 with the epochal decision in Durham v. United States,8 in
which Judge Bazelon of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, an outstanding jurist who firmly believes in the benefits
of psychoanalysis, freed by the law of capacity of its medieval ves-
tiges, liberated it from the fetters of the 1843 M'Naghten standards
and from legalistic criteria, and thus opened the issue of "insanity"
to completely unbridled discussion by psychiatric experts, testifying
at the bar, simply in terms of whether the crime charged was the
product of mental disease or disorder. That the decision amounted
to an enormous liberalization cannot be doubted in view of the impact
on the acquittal rate; acquittals by reason of insantiy in the District
of Columbia increased more than tenfold within five years after the
new test was created. 9 Whereas before the Durham case those
acquitted consisted almost exclusively of psychotics, after Durham,
acquittals became customary of psychopaths, neurotics or behav-
iorally disturbed offenders as well.
Everybody with the least bit of an opinion on the subject took
sides in the years after 1954. A liberal wing, composed primarily of
5. "... [I)t must be clearly proved that at the time of the committing
of the act the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing, or as not to know that what he was doing was wrong." M'Naughten's
Case, 10 C. & F. 200, 8 Eng. 8 Rep. 718, 719 (H.L. 1843). See also Diamond,
Isaac Ray and the Trial of Daniel M'Naghten, 112 Am. J. Psych. 651 (1956).
6. That is, the defendant must be able to know the nature and quality of
his action (reference to actus reus).
7. That is, the defendant must be able to know the wrongfulness of his
action (reference to mens rea). Unfortunately, most trial lawyers, prosecutors
and judges fail to appreciate the full significance of the test and think of it
merely as establishing the criteria of the defendant's cognitive capacity to know
right, from wrong. Where such gross misunderstanding exists, rational verdicts
obviously cannot be obtained. Wrong instructions lead to wrong verdicts. ".
[Tihe fear expressed by some members of both bench and bar that instructions
are ignored or not given serious consideration in the jury room is not justified."
James, Juror's Assessment of Criminal Responsibility, 7 Soc. Prob. 58, 68 (1959).
8. 214 F.2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
9. Clayton, Six Years After Durham, 44 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y. 18 (1960).
'1965]
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the avant-garde of modern psychiatry of the social-defense persua-
sion, 1 0 as well as of defense lawyers, 11 immediately formed in favor
of the new test. A conservative wing, composed of practically all
prosecutors,1 2 some of the best known forensic. psychiatrists, 13 and
legal scholars, 1 4 also soon formed. At the risk of oversimplification,
10. E.g., Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness-Two Faces of the Same
Coin, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 320 (1955); Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert
Witness, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 325 (1955); Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened
Justice, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 331 (1955); Freedman Guttmacher and Overholser,
Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility, 1961 Wash.. U.L.Q. 250;
Dearman, Criminal Responsibility and Insanity Tests: A Psychiatrist Looks at
Three Cases, 47 Va. L. Rev. 1388 (1961); Overholser, Criminal Responsibility:.
A Psychiatrist's Viewpoint, 48 A.B.A.J. 527 (1962); MacDonald, Psychiatry and
Colorado Criminal Law, 36 Dicta 74 (1959); Brancale, More on McNaughton:.. A
Psychiatrist's View, 65 Dick. L. Rev. 277 (1961); Schreiber, The Durham Deci-
sion--A Beacon in the Dark, 40 Ment. Hyg. 295 (1956); Ibanez, Bridging the
Gap on Concepts of Mental Illness, 1 (2) Crim. L. Q. 23 (1963).
11. The victory in the Durham case had itself been won by an outstanding
defense lawyer with a liberal Yale law faculty tradition-Abe Fortas, Esq.
12. E.g., Ward, The M'Naghten Rule: A Re-Evaluation, 45 Marq. L. Rev.
506 (1962); Gasch, Prosecution Problems Under the Durham Rule, 5 Catholic
Law. 5 (1959); Kuh, The Insanity Defense-An Effort to Combine Law and
Reason, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 771 (1962). The New York District Attorneys Asso-
ciation has strenuously resisted all proposed repeals of the M'Naghten standards.
... [Pirosecutors ... are likely to be traditionalists. Concededly, it is too easy
to look at something new, with a viewpoint molded by years of personal experi-
ences and weighed down by ages of inherited lore, and to equate 'new'. With
'visionary,' 'unrealistic,' and 'impractical'." Kuh, A Prosecutor Considers the
Model. Penal Code, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 608 (1963)..
13. E.g., Szasz, Psychiatry. Ethics and the Criminal Law; 58 Colum. L. Rev.
183 (1958); Davidson, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE QUEST FOR A FORMULA,
IN PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 61 (Hoch & Zubin eds., 1955); Davidson, Irresistible
Impulse and Criminal Responsibility, 1 (2) J. For Sci. 1 (1956); Wertham,
Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev.:336 (1955); Cavanagh,
.Problems of a Psychiatrist in Operating Under the M'Naghten, Durham and
Model Penal Code Rules, 45 Marq. L. Rev. 478 (1962).
14. E.g., Hall, Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility-M'Naghten
Versus Durham and the American Law Institute's Tentative Draft, 33 Ind. L. J.
212 (1958); Hall, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 449-528 (2nd ed. 1960);
Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 Yale L. J. 761 (1956); Hall,
Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the McNaughten Rules, 42 A.B.A.j. 917
(1956); Hofstadter & Levittan, The M'Naghten Rules-A Reappraisal and a Pro-
posal, 140 N.Y.L.J. Nos. 53-57, p. 4, col. 1 (1958); De Grazia, The Distinction of
'Being Mad, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 339 (1955); see also Snyder, Criminal Responsi-
bility, 1962 Duke L. J. 204; Snyder, The M'Naghten Rule, 10 Kan. L. Rev. 69
(1961); Moreland, Mental Responsibility and the Criminal Law-A Defence, 45
Ky. L. J. 213 (1956). That the legal-psychiatric conservative position may Well be
reconcilable with a position of political liberalism is indicated by the support for
the M'Naghten criteria by such a liberal intellectual as Rubin, A New Approach
to M'Naghten v. Durham, 45 .J. Am. Jud. Soc'y. 133 (1961).
[Vol. 3 :]..137
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.the liberal* position may be summarized as follows: The question :of
mental capacity is. entirely one of medicine and must -be answered
in concreto as far as each individual defendant is concerned, but in
abstracto as far as the consequent criminal liability is concerned.
Only that can assure a humane disposition in each criminal case, by
protecting mentally or emotionally ill offenders from punishment,
while protecting society again depredations. The conservative posi-
tion may be summarized-as follows: The question of mental capacity
is. one of (fact and) law, to be answered by the court, though with
medical :guidance.- And while it must be answered in :concreto for
each individual defendant, that can be done only in concreto as far
as criminal liability is concerned, for each crime has its own and
different psychological elements, all of which, however, can be con-
.ceptualized in terms broad enough to cover all criminality. The
'M'Naghten Rules are precisely that conceptualization. Despite the
restriction upon psychiatric inquiry through this legal-conceptual
framework, society can be optimally protected, and just dispositions
are possible only within this framework. I have idealized both posi-
tions to some extent. Mr. Justice Brennan, without of course ap-
proving it, characterized the conservative position more realistically
(in its emotional rather than rational terms), as follows: ". . Any
other test would produce a system 'soft on criminals' and destructive
of. principles of morality and good order."15
Very few of the protagonists of the M'Naghten test are wholly
.satisfied with its 1843 formulation. Proposed revisions are of two
types: (1) the analytical structure of the test would remain, but all
component elements of the test would be modernized so as to conform
with current psychiatric knowledge and semantic usage; 1 6 (2) the
analytical structure of the test would be abandoned by omitting
reference to the "act" requirement and focusing solely on the mens
rea (or criminal intent) requirement but with reference to freedom
of the will, or freedom from inner compulsion. 17
All those opposed to the Durham test, which was labelled the
triumph of modern psychiatry, were instantly called retrograde, re-
tributive, and opposed to scientific advance and to psychiatry in par-
ticular. When some leading forensic psychiatrists joined the con-
servative wing, they too were similarly attacked by their brethren.
Here, then, is an issue on which the battle lines are clearly drawn
in terms of liberal and conservative. Now it has happened that in the
1.5. Brennan, Law and Psychiatry Must Join in Defending Mentally Ill
Criminals, 49 A.B.A.J. 239 (1963).
16. Hall, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 449-528 (2nd Ed. 1960).
17. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 4.02-09 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
.196S]"- , 14
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ten years of its life, the new test 1 s proved so unworkable, for want
of guiding criteria, that it had to be largely modified, if not aban-
doned.' 9 Since the court had, in effect, left all definition of mental
disease to the medical profession, every re-definition of diagnostic
entities by majority vote of hospital staffs changed the legal disposi-
tion of cases and introduced utmost uncertainty.2 ° This led to a
lively revolt within the Durham court itself and, in at least one re-
spect, the court finally returned to its former position that the jury
is not bound by the expert testimony, but ". . must determine for
itself from all the testimony, lay and expert, whether the nature and
degree of the disability are sufficient to establish a mental disease
or defect. '" 2 1 There is even some indication that the court might
return to a more concrete description of the referent of mental illness,
namely, the crime in question. While the Durham test merely asked
whether there was some causal relation between mental illness and
the crime charged, which nexus was presumed and could be rebutted
only by contrary evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the court is
likely to come back to the sounder position of M'Naghten, which tells
the jury that "crime" consists of: (1) specific rational action (the
actus reus); and, (2) a specific negative frame of mind to do harm
(the mens rea). 2 2
A reviewer of the development of this controversy - which is prob-
ably the epitome of all current controversies between and within law
and psychiatry - may get the impression that the technical con-
siderations just discussed really do not matter at all. Indeed, stands
were taken primarily along emotional lines, e.g., the "new" vs. the
"old." The liberals regarded the "old" as bad and retrograde while
the conservatives regarded it as upright, moral and tough. The "new"
was regarded as good, progressive and liberal by the liberals and as
18. Which, unbeknownst to the court, had been phrased as early as 1880.
Note, Criminal Law and Insanity, 3 N.J.L.J. 232 (1880).
19. Reid, Back Two, Forward One-Durham Staggers On, 5 (2) J. Off. Ther.
.15 (1961); Reid, The Bell Tolls for Durham, 6 J. Off. Ther. 58 (1962).
20. Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572 (D. C. Cir. 1959); Campbell v.
United States, 307 F.2d 597 (D. C. Cir. 1962).
21. McDonald v. United States, 310 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1962); Hawkins v.
United States, 310 F.2d 849 (D. C. Cir. 1962).
The very nature of this question suggests an inherent weakness in
the Durham test. Because Durham-unlike M'Naghten-lacks criteria to
which the effects of the medical condition could be referred-resulting in
absurd acquittals--the court felt constrained to impose on complete lay-
men the burden of answering the medical question whether a medical
condition is so incapacitating as to amount to a disease or defect. This is
a medical-diagnostic question which has nothing to do with the jury's
traditional function of applying fact to law.
22. Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572 (D. C. Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 3: p. 137
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fanciful and nihilistic by the conservatives. Whether, however, the
old or the new is just and utilitarian is a wholly different matter.
It is submitted that in this case, the so-called conservative position
is the proper one. It determines in a conceptually certain and thus
scientifically accurate manner the real question at the bar, namely:
did this defendant have the intellectual or emotional capacity to ful-
fill the purely psychic as well as axiological elements of the crime
with which he stands charged? If that question be not asked, then the
issue before the court will not be resolved; and if it is not resolved,
any disposition, perforce, is inaccurate and unjust.
It is said that only the so-called liberal (Durham) position deter-
mines in a psychiatrically proper way the real diagnosis of a mentally
distrubed defendant. Perhaps that is so, though there is no reason
why a defendant committed to a diagnostic center in a state with
the M'Naghten test cannot be properly diagnosed. But this is not the
crucial point, for the diagnosis is not the justiciable issue. Defendants
are not charged with "schizophrenic reation catatonic type" or with
"psychoneurotic phobic reactions." They are charged with murder
in the first degree or with arson in the second degree.
Suppose that a hitherto very successful businessman, who through
hard labor and sound investments had amassed a little fortune, lost
it overnight when his bookkeeper absconded wtih the assets. Faced
with financial ruin and disgrace, our businessman sets fire to his
warehouse in order to collect his insurance. Now he stands charged
with arson in the second degree. 2 3 The defense is insanity by reason
of a phobic reaction manifesting itself by such idiosyncrasies as that
the defendant never steps on the cracks of the sidewalk or that he ex-
periences extreme anxiety when at high altitudes. One might here pos-
sibly speak of an incapacity to step on sidewalk cracks or ascend to
the tops of skyscrapers. If the failure to do either were a crime, the
defendant would surely have a genuine defense. But the charge is
arson in the second degree, and we have to establish whether the
defendant's particular psychoneurosis had incapacitating effects on
the psychic (including axiological) elements of the crime of arson
in the second degree. Certainly a psychiatrist should be heard on this
medical question .of fact, but the decision must rest with the court,
i.e., judge and jury, because there is at bar a legal question of fact.
This question can be answered only if:
(1) all the facts, here principally medical, are before the
court; and,
(2) the question is asked in a proper way.
23. NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 222.5.
19651
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Both debating factions are agreed on the first point. Psychiatrists
must be given an opportunity for proper diagnosis and for testifying
as to all their relevant findings. This is a procedural problem which,
unfortunately, in many states has not been properly resolved, though
in the District of Columbia, as part of the Durham decision, it ap-
parently has been. This neither speaks for the Durham test nor
against the M'Naghten test. In fact, it has nothing to do with the test.
The crucial question is not asked in.the proper way when the test
is phrased merely in terms of a relation - of which the effect is pre-
sumed if a "cause," i.e., any deviancy medically labelled a disease, is
established - between the disease or defect and the crime charged.
In the first place, such a test tells us nothing of the potential or actual
effect of the disease and, in the second, it gives us no basis for relat-
ing the disease to those elements of the crime charged which might
be affected by the disease. In short, a general reference to "crime" in
the abstract is unsatisfactory; rather, one must focus on the specific
elements of the crime charged. In our example of arson in the second
degree, one should seek out the relations between the disease and the
psychological aspects in each of the two halves of the concept of
the crime of arson in the second degree, as follows:
I. Actus Reus (i.e., the psychological elements of the
actus reu8) :
Did the defendant know (appreciate) the nature and quality
of his act? In particular, did the defendant "willfully burn
a building?" In other words, was this a rational action of
burning or was, perhaps, the defendant suffering from such
an ego impairment as to make the act wholly different from
his - or anybody else's - usual rational activities, like
riding the subway or buying stock. In popular language, did
the defendant know what he was doing?
II. Mens Rea:
Did the defendant "intend to defraud the insurer thereof ?"
In other words, did the defendant have a meaningful, i.e., a
depth appreciation of the wrongfulness of his action, a spe-
cific wrongfulness in terms of a desire, or a knowledge, that
the burning would accrue to the detriment of his insurer?
Did the defendant appreciate how society feels about this
act ?
If both questions be answered in the affirmative, the defendant is
guilty of the crime charged and will be subjected to the sanction and
socialization efforts of the penal law, from which the defendant is
[Vol. 3: p. 137
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likely to profit considerably more than from enforced association with
the psychotics in an institution for the criminally insane. 2 4
In sum: The liberals, in their ardent desire to be progressive and
humanitarian 2 5 and to prefer modern psychiatry over old law, have
departed from sound principles of adjudicating issues presented at
the bar of the court. Being wrong in theory, they are bound to reach
wrong dispositions in practice, by populating institutions for psy-
chotic security risks with behaviorally disordered persons who need
either ambulatory therapy or, more frequently, value orientation
through resocialization efforts. It is submitted that the so-called
liberal position is inconsistent with true liberal goals. 2 6
CRIMINAL LAW - THE SPECIAL PART: THE ISSUE OF
REGULATORY, ESPECIALLY ECONOMIC, OFFENSES
During the last century, concomitant with the industrial revolution,
the number of penal offenses on the statute books has been multiplied
many times by the addition of so-called regulatory offenses to the list
of common-law crimes. Most of these offenses are directly or in-
directly concerned with the regulation of the economy. Each one of
the new offenses, 2 7 at least originally, was meant to promote the
welfare of the population, particularly in the sphere where it was
believed that the unorganized consumer or other participant in the
economic or social activities of society had no personal means of
protection or was oblivious to the dangers which the legislature, in
24. See particularly the minority report of Commissioner Friedman, in
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, SPECIAL COMMISSION ON INSANITY AND CRIMINAL OFFEND-
ERS, FIRST REPORT, July 7, 1962, pp. 60-67.
25. See Raab, A Moralist Looks at the Durham and M'Naghten Rules, 46
Minn. L. Rev. 327 (1961).
26. This chapter does not deal with attempts to achieve political com-
promises on the question of the "insanity defense," like that proposed (but after
unanimous opposition of the District Attorneys Association rejected) in New
York. See Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N. Y., 1961 Leg. Bull. No. 32, pp. 1-5.
MODEL PENAL CODE, § § 4.02-09 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Wechsler, The
Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 367 (1955).
27. Many of the offenses are not entirely novel. Thus, pure-food offenses had
their common-law predecessors, most of them of the nuisance type. But these
were generally free from all the characteristics of modern regulatory offenses
here to be discussed. Particularly, they all pertained to conduct generally known
to be obnoxious or immoral. See generally Starrs, The Regulatory Offenses in His-
torical Perspective, ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SCIENCE 233 (Mueller ed. 1961).
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its wisdom, had spotted. 28 These new laws, by the very nature of the
real or fancied evils against which they are directed, are virtually all
distinguishable from orthodox criminality by: (1) the dragnet
nature of coverage ("restraint of trade," "suitable fire escape," "food
and necessities"); (2) the enormous discretion, especially of selective
enforcement, vested in prosecutors and regulatory agencies; 2 9 and,
(3) the feature of absolute liability, a doctrine under which punish-
ment is imposed for doing the act regardless of whether the actor
knew of his "wrongdoing," whether he exercised care to avoid the
result, or whether he has any defense at all.3 0
While in the 19th century this new type and form of criminality
merely grew wild, a semblance of reasoned support came in the 20th
century, together with reasoned arguments against the doctrine.
Economic liberals were, of course, quite opposed to any such tam-
pering with man's freedom, and to a considerable extent this has
remained the attitude of the business community 3' with the rapidly
increasing support of the legal scholars. 3 2 Support for the new type
and form of criminality comes mainly from federal, state and local
government circles, particularly from officials who had been con-
nected with government planning functions like those of the regula-
tion boom of World War II and the post-war years. This group in-
cludes the career prosecutors whom, in the discussion of our first
28. For the enormous range of this type of legislation, and the legislative
carefreeness (carelessness) in drafting, see Remington et al., Liability Without
Fault Criminal Statutes--Their Relation to Major Developments in Contemporary
Economic and Social Policy: The Situation in Wisconsin, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 625.
29. Professor Remington, after a definitive study of the Wisconsin regula-
tory legislation, found ". . . a delegation of large discretion to administrative
personnel to apply the statutes in a way deemed by them to be proper." Reming-
ton, supra note 28, at 626.
30. Here, as elsewhere, generalization is dangerous. Regulatory offenses
are not necessarily offenses of absolute liability, and vice versa! See generally
Hall, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, ch. 10 (2d ed. 1960). For older, and
largely outdated assessments, see Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of
Another, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (1930); Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974
(1932); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933); Sayre,
The Present Significance of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, Harv. Leg. Essays
399 (1934). While some of these offenses permit no defenses at all, others do
recognize some defenses.
31. For example, see the virtually unanimous opposition of the food and
drug industry to the Drug Industry Act of 1962. Hearings before the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R., 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., H.R. 11581,
H.R. 11582, June 19-22, Aug. 20-23, (1962).
32. E.g., Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob.
401 (1958), as quite representative. Unfortunately, the Model Penal Code of the
American Law Institute (§ 2.05), while condemning absolute criminal liability
as such, retains it for petty offenses not entailing imprisonment.
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issue, we found among the conservative wing. Since many, if not
most, of the supporters of modern regulatory penal law also are
political liberals, we have here an instance where the liberals take
the position adverse to freedom from government restraint.
This at once pinpoints the issue as seen by the political liberals:
long range maximum freedom requires the maintenance of a rigorous
set of controls on unbridled freedom in our complex society.3 3 A
tough law, permitting no excuses,3 4 administered by discretion-
invested officials who can find anybody to have violated the law and
who therefore, in the exercise of discretion, will dispense mercy to
those who at least show good will, is required for a maximally effec-
tive enforcement of the substantive policies. The protection of the
public 3 5 demands the conviction of all violators, guilty or innocent,
and such is simply the price which must be paid for the ultimate
product of the greatest good of the greatest number, whether the
purpose be the prohibition of overweight truck carriage or the avoid-
ance of monopolies and trade combines. 3 6
To thepolitical conservative, who dreads any move in the direction
of the regimented society of 1984, the issue is full of emotion, though
it would seem that the more rational argument is also with him, as
follows:
(1) Those who advocate the proliferation of restrictions on free-
dom through regulatory penal law frequently overlook the fact that,
on the whole, "natural" "laws," such as those of supply and demand,
of psychological stimulus and response, or of professional or indus-
trial self-policing, are significant conduct regulators. For example,
businessmen can prosper in the long run only by pleasing the con-
sumer, and law can do little to increase the desire to please. Similarly,
motorists value their lives so that law, by threatening a fine, can do
little to increase the desire to continue living.3 7 I remember how
33. Speaking of the Anti-Trust Laws, Mr. Abe Fortas wrote: "The state's
function, in antitrust theory, is merely to assure that the competitive battle is
waged free from restraints." Fortas, America's Electrical Price Conspiracy, 5
(3) The Lawyer 29 (1962).
34. "It is not evident, . . . that strict liability statutes cannot have a deter-
rent effect greater than that of ordinary criminal satutes." Wasserstrom, Strict
Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 731, 732 (1960).
35. 1.... [W]hen dealing with certain regulatory offenses, ... protection
of the public interest is of paramount concern." State v. Blackburn, 164 N.E.2d
734, 738 (1960).
36. For a convenient listing of the regulatory offenses see Sayre, Public
Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933); Perkins, The Civil Offense, 100
U. Pa. L. Rev. 832 (1952).
37. "Rate of speed studies... have established that most drivers travel at
speeds they consider safe for the highway and the prevailing driving conditions."
N. Y. Times, March 29, 1959, §2, p. 21, cols. 1-4.
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impressed I was by a public sign on a bridge reading "Diving off this
bridge is dangerous to life and subject to $10 fine."
(2) By phrasing the regulatory statutes in terms meant to reach
everybody, at all times, in all spheres of life, an energy dissipation
takes place and nobody is squarely reached, 38 though some may be
reached negligbly by selective enforcement. 3 9 But selective enforce-
ment by a discretion-invested bureaucracy is the source of man's
greatest plight, governmental corruption, as scandals of the one-a-day
brand constantly remind us. 4 0
(3) The law enforcement conservatives usually overlook the fact
that punishments under laws which either are arbitrary, or which at
least may be enforced arbitrarily, and which, thus, may befall the
guilty and the innocent, the careful and the careless alike, will en-
gender disrespect for all law and its enforcement and result in the
utmost frustration of those supposedly regulated, 4 1 an experience
which the regulators try to counteract with demands for further
regulatory laws of the same sort.
(4) In terms of simple psychology, the attitude of the law en-
forcement conservatives, here posing as social liberals, is particularly
weak. It is generally recognized that, to be maximally effective, the
38. The point has been one of dispute. See Wasserstrom, supra note 34, at
737. This point is the subject of a paper to be published shortly, sub. tit., "Is
There an Inverse Square Law of Penal Regulation?"
39. Cf., Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutor's Discre-
tion, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 64, 83 (1948).
40. While these words are being written, the entire structure of N. Y.
State government is being shaken by the so-called "liquor board scandal," which
has already resulted in dozens of arrests, indictments, impeachments, murder
of witnesses and suicides, among governmental officials, high and low, including
judges. See Life, April 5, 1963, p. 22. Even the State Attorney General's reputa-
tion is tarnished. N. Y. World Tele. & Sun, April 30, 1963, p. 1.
41. "To make a practice of branding people as criminals who are without
moral fault tends to weaken respect for the law and the social condemnation of
those who break it, 'When it becomes respectable to be convicted, the vitality of
the criminal law has been sapped'." Williams, CRIMINAL LAW-THE GENERAL
PART 259 (2nd ed. 1961), citing Sayre, Harv. Leg. Essays 409 (1934). It is note-
worthy, however, that Sayre, nevertheless, supported absolute criminal liability
to a considerable extent.
An alienation of those regulated has occurred among the heavily regulated
food and drug industry so that the Food and Drug Administration's Citizens
Advisory Committee was recently forced to urge the F.D.A. ". . . to develop
specific programs designed to encourage a cooperative attitude toward the
development of standards and a sincere industry desire to comply voluntarily
with the accepted standards for industry operations." CITIZENS ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WBLFARE ON THE
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION IX-7 (1962).
[Vol. 3 : p. 137
OF LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM
threat of criminal punishment must be plainly directed to receptive
human minds, i.e., those which know or can know what they are
doing, and that any threat otherwise directed is fruitless and waste-
ful. For that reason, under traditional law, persons with unreceptive
minds, such as those acting under unavoidable ignorance of fact 4
2
or of law,4 3 or who are mentally incapacitated, 4 4 are exempted from
the imposition of punishment. When it comes to the regulatory
offenses, however, law enforcement conservatives argue the exact
opposite:
The purpose of . . . [these] regulations is the accomplish-
ment of some social betterment rather than the punishment
of crime, and therefore, the requisite of criminal intent is
eliminated to insure the desired social result. 4 5
If it be remembered that the prime purpose of punishing, or of
threatening punishment, is that of "social engineering" in an effort
to maximally prevent socially dangerous consequences, in other words,
insurance of desired social results, how can it be argued in the same
breath that the most useless thing is to impose punishment on those
who are blameless, and that the most useful thing is to impose
punishment on the blameless and the blameworthy alike?46
In the final assessment one comes to realize that the proliferation of
regulatory penal law, especially in the economic sphere, is "social
engineering" at its worst. As Hall put it: "The legislature is lulled
into complacency by 'passing a law'; prosecutors are content with the
bulk of statistics on 'convictions'; and the general public is grossly
uninformed." 47 Not improvement of social conditions, but the op-
posite, is more likely to result from this modern type of regulatory
penal legislation. Quite apart from the general frustration of the
over-regulated public, with its consequent diminution of respect for
all law, havoc rather than order is the result of hasty tampering with
42. See generally Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 Ind. L. J.
1 (1957). Fortunately, this defense is now becoming more and more recognized
even in those regulatory offenses which in the past have been subject to absolute
liability. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Cf. Packer, Mens Rea and
the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 107.
43. Ham v. M'Claws, 1 S.C. 93 (1789); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957); United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1961).
44. See authorities cited note 3(1) supra.
45. Note, De Paul L. Rev. 329, 331 (1962), citing United States v. Balint.
258 U.S. 250 (1922). See Pound, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 52 (1921).
46. Friedmann, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 199 (1959), leaving that ques-
tion unresolved.
47. Hall, op. cit. supra note 30, at 345.
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basic conduct patters. 48 By way of example, Mr. Fortas recently
averted to the crippling fines imposed upon some of the smaller
electrical-equipment manufacturers, under the nation's best-known
economic penal laws, and commented:
If they don't survive as competitors of the giants, or if the
net outcome is to enfeeble their financial capability and
therefore their capacity to compete, competition in the
industry may well suffer, rather than benefit, as the after-
math of this spectacular instance of law enforcement. But
such is life in the land of the free and the home of the
brave. 4 9
Thus, once again, the social or political liberals' humanitarian con-
cern for the actual and fancied sufferings of the populace have led
them intellectually somewhat astray. For totally different reasons,
their ranks are swelled by the law enforcement conservatives (mostly
prosecutors) who, just as they did by their stand on the first issue,
certainly raise the suspicion of being more interested in more con-
victions, 50 than in the end product of greater freedom of man in
society. The economic liberals seem to have the better of the argu-
ment, not only in terms of the all-American credo of the government
of laws rather than men, but also in terms of abundant experience
with the type of law they detest-though scientific verification
through field research as yet is lacking.
CRIMINAL LAW ADMINISTRATION:
THE ISSUE OF POLICE INTERROGATION 51
In recent years, state law enforcement has been increasingly sub-
jected to supervision by the United States Supreme Court, which
gradually made more and more provisions of the Bill of Rights bind-
48. See Stengren, Jaywalking Law Brings Auto Jams-Drivers Can't Turn
Corner If They Yield, As Required, To Pedestrian Stream-Heavy Back-Ups
Noted, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1958, p. 23, col. 1.
49. Fortas, supra note 33, at 29.
50. See Note, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 1103, 1106 (1944), with comment thereon by
Hall, op. cit. supra note 30, at 349.
51. Lawyers debate this question primarily in terms of the most common
consequences of abuse, namely, exclusion of coerced confessions from the evidence
at the trial. See POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, pts. 2 and 3 (Sowle ed.
1962). But the issue is of independent significance apart from the exclusionary
rule and will here be discussed on its own merits.
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ing on the states, 5 2 via the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 5 3 Probably no state law enforcement activity is now free
from federal standards. This is particularly true of the police practice
of questioning arrested persons in an effort to obtain admissions and
confessions, before the suspect is produced before a magistrate, or
meets an attorney, or in an other way is assured of his rights as a
citizen, particularly the right to remain silent.5 4 To the great distress
of law enforcement officials, the Supreme Court will now reverse
any conviction in state courts-the standard is even more stringent
for federal courts-which rested on the defendant's confession ob-
tained by uncivilized practices. These need not even involve physical
coercion; mere mental tormenting 5 5 is sufficiently obnoxious. On
this issue, sides had been taken from the beginning of our republic. 5 6
Since the issue is not one which has excited the populace in
general, 5 7 the side taking has been largely restricted to the legal
52. For the development up to 1958 see Allen, The Supreme Court, Federal-
ism and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 (1) U. Chi. L. S. Rec. 3 (1958),
also at 8 De Paul L. Rev. 213 (1959). The most important cases since then in-
clude Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), requiring the remedy of exclusion of
all evidence obtained in violation of federal constitutional limitations on searches
and seizures; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), extending the sixth
amendment right to (assigned) counsel to all criminal defendants in all cases;
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), extending the exclusionary
rule to verbal statements unlawfully obtained. Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33
(1963): ". . . [T]he standard of reasonableness [for search and seizure] is the
same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments ......
The 1964 term of the Supreme Court added the following landmark cases:
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), holding that the fifth amendment's excep-
tion from compulsory self-incrimination is protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment against abridgement by the states, with the elaboration in Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), that one sovereign within our
system may not force a witness to testify, by extension of a local self-incrimina-
tion under the laws of another sovereign within the system. Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964), moving forward a differentiation of arrest standards with
and without a warrant. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), holding con-
fession inadmissible if made by defendant to police who had failed to warn him
of this self-incrimination privilege and refused access to his attorney.
53. U. S. CONSTITUTION, amend. XIV, § 1: ". . . [N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; . . ."
54. While it is too early to fathom the implications of Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964), it is fair to assume that the Supreme Court will henceforth
strike down confessions obtained by the police who failed to warn the defendant
of his 5th-14th amendments' self-incrimination privilege. Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964).
55. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S.
528 (1963).
56. See State v. Hobbs, 2 Tyler 380 (Vt. 1803).
57. Because abusive questioning is carried on in secrecy. When abuse does
occur in public, only the most upright and sensitive citizens have the oourage
to intervene and risk their liberty by publicizing the abuse.
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community. The academicians, the group of political civil libertarians
and law enforcement officers, have been the most vociferous debaters.
The views are clear enough within the second and third group. Law
enforcers, whom so far we have once found in the conservative and
once in the liberal camp, with extremely slight, but outspoken aca-
demic support, 5 8 are in clear opposition to the civil libertarians, 5 9 to
whom all direct and not absolutely necessary interference with the
civil rights of the individual are anathema. The civil libertarians en-
joy the support of most of the criminal-law academicians. 6 0 We are
more or less forced to call theirs the liberal position, and the law en-
forcers' the conservative one.
The conservative argument goes as follows:
1. Many criminal cases, even when investigated by the best
qualified police departments, are capable of solution only by
means of an admission or confession from the guilty in-
dividual or upon the basis of information obtained from the
questioning of other criminal suspects.
2. Criminal offenders, except, of course, those caught in
the commission of their crimes, ordinarily will not admit
their guilt unless questioned under conditions of privacy,
and for a period of perhaps several hours.
3. In dealing with criminal offenders, and consequently also
with criminal suspects who may actually be innocent, the
interrogator must of necessity employ less refined methods
than are considered appropriate for the transaction of ordi-
nary, everday affairs by and between law-abiding citizens.6 1
The libertarians' argument is just as clear:
It is secrecy which creates the risk of abuses ... and which
contributes to public distrust of the police .... Eliminating
secrecy in police-station questioning could go far to build
58. The few who have taken conservative positions include Inbau, Law
and Police Practice: Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions,
52 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77 (1957); Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the Unitea
States Supreme Court, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 442 (1948); see also Snyder, Justice at
the Expense of Truth: A Comment on the Opinion in Rogers v. Richmond, 10
Kan. L. Rev. 425 (1962); Collings, Criminal Law and Administration, 1957 Ann.
Survey Am. L. 93, 107-109 (1958).
59. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Illinois Division), SECRET DETENTION
BY THE CHICAGO POLICE (1959).
60. E.g., Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6
Stan. L. Rev. 411 (1954).
61. Inbau, Police Interrogation-a Practical Necessity, 52 J. Crim. L.,
C. & P.S. 16, 17, 19 (1961).
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public confidence in the police, the kind of confidence to
which the police should be entitled and which in the long run
may prove a more powerful aid to effective law enforcement
than the most refined methods for obtaining confessions.
The absence of a record [during station house questioning]
makes disputes inevitable about the conduct of the police
and, sometimes, about what the prisoner has actually said.
It is secrecy, not privacy, which accounts for the absence of
a reliable record .... 62
It is hard to imagine issues on which the supposed clash between
the individual's freedom from government interference and society's
demand for protection against the dangers lurking in the minds and
activities of the potential adversaries is more pronounced. What is at
stake, however, is simply the question of the most efficient detection
of threatened or concealed danger at the least expense to man's
primary freedom. Viewed in these terms, the conservative's demands
seem excessive on closer examination. As the libertarians would point
out, the demand for interrogation of arrested persons in privacy might
not be inconsistent with the requirement that all such questioning be
filmed and recorded 6 3 or, at less expense, be conducted in the presence
of counsel or friends, who can observe the questioning through a
one-way mirror or a closed circuit TV system.
But such proposals do not meet with the approval of the conserva-
tives. This raises the suspicion that the law enforcement conserva-
tives are not interested in privacy per se, 6 4 but only in privacy as
affording an opportunity for the employment of "less refined
methods." When it comes to the employment of "less refined methods"
in the questioning of suspects, is it not true that a considerable
majority of those suspected of crime and questioned will never be
found guilty 6 5 and may even be law-abiding citizens?
62. Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View,
52 J. Crim. L., C & P.S. 21, 44, 46 (1961); see also POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM, 153 (Sowle ed. 1962).
63. Id. at 45.
64. A single case has become known in which law enforcement officers
made a sound-tract motion picture of an "interview"-confession of a suspect,
during incommunicado holding. Immediately thereafter, however, the officers'
interest in privacy vanished rather swiftly. The film was released to the local
television station and subsequently viewed by about % of all residents of the
area, during showing on three consecutive days. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963). The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, as obtained in a
jurisdiction in which, after a "Television Trial," no fair trial in court could be
obtained.
65. According to the Uniform Crime Reports for 1960, 76.3% of persons
formally charged with crimes in the United States were found guilty (p. 86),
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A police prerogative to treat every one of their suspects as if he
were a criminal, denying him common courtesies or worse, is a most
serious encroachment upon the liberties of free citizens. Among
those unjustly harassed, disrespect for the police will be instilled, and
the sad tales of those citizens are likely to have epidemic effects in
the community at large. Moreover, the imposition of "less refined
methods" upon the citizenry by the organs of the state, adds a new
restriction upon the citizen. To the command: "Do not commit
crime," there is then, in effect, added a further command: "under
penalty of official restraint through 'less refined methods', do not
arouse the suspicion of crime."' 6 6 That, it is submitted, seriously
interferes with the citizen's freedom of action and locomotion.
This necessitates a brief description of the types of questioning em-
ployed by the police. One could distinguish between interviews, inter-
rogations and inquisitions. ". . . [I]nterviews . . .are conducted to
learn facts from persons who may have knowledge of a wrongful act
but who are not themselves implicated."' 6 7 Interviews are free from
even the semblance of constraint and are carried on in a civilized
fashion, although the interviewee may subsequently become a suspect
himself. "... [I]nterrogations,.. . are conducted to learn facts and to
obtain admissions or confessions of wrongful acts from persons who
are implicated in a wrongful act." 68 The type of questioning with
the maximum of constraint, and under employment of abusive prac-
tices-formerly physical, now usually only psychological-is referred
to as "inquisition," 6 9 which the United States Constitution clearly
outlaws for both federal and state law enforcement bodies. Legal
issues are not raised by mere interviews. In a free country everybody,
and that includes the police, is entitled to ask anybody any question he
desires, though he is not necessarily entitled to any answers. Inter-
but the F. B. I. releases no figures documenting the enormous gap between the
number of arrests and the number of formal charges. It is here where the
largest selection takes place. See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke
the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice,
69 Yale L. J. 543 (1960).
66. In this connection it is worth mentioning that in states where the
so-called Uniform Arrest Act, [see Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va.
L. Rev. 315 (1942). It is in force in Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island
and Massachusetts, as well as in New York under its "Stop-and-Frisk" Law,
(Laws of 1964, ch. 86. See Kuh, New York's "Stop-and-Frisk" Law, N.Y.L.J.,
May 29, 1964, p. 4)] a person may be taken into police custody on evidence less
than probable cause.
67. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 36 (Field Manual
19-20, 1951).
68. Ibid.
69. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1960).
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rogation, then, is the bone of contention. While law enforcement
conservatives would like to utilize the whole keyboard of psychological
stimulation to obtain satements from suspects, including trickery,
deceit and the instilling of fear, 7 0 the United States Supreme Court
has become more and more sensitive to these methods, as the Rogers
case demonstrates. Rogers, a forty-eight year old Negro with an
eighth-grade education, was suspected of murder and held incom-
municado. The questioning police officer threatened to bring in "for
questioning Rogers' [arthritic] wife if Rogers did not confess. He
threatened to send the two foster children of the Rogers', who were
statewards, to an institution meanwhile," and
... made a pretended telephone call on a dead wire to hold
a car and officers in readiness to get Mrs. Rogers and the
children. He then gave Rogers an hour to make up his mind
whether to confess. At the end of that time he took the
phone to pretend to order Mrs. Rogers and the children
brought in. At this point Rogers gave in and made a confes-
sion .... 71
The Supreme Court ruled that this confession was obtained by
compulsion, i.e., by an overbearing of the will, and thus violated
civilized practices so that, regardless of its probative value,7 2 it
should not have been introduced in evidence. The Court reversed
the conviction. 7 3
In the more recent case of Haynes v. Washington,7 4 the Court
proved even more sensitive when it overruled a conviction resting on a
confession obtained during an incommunicado holding. The police
had refused the suspect any communication with relatives, friends or
an attorney until he confessed.
Oddly enough, all these decisions had to be placed on the vague
civilized standards" basis of fourteenth amendment due process,
70. Lewellen, How to Make A Killer Confess [an article on Professor Inbau
of Northwestern University], Saturday Evening Post, March 31, 1956, p. 33.
71. United States ex rel. Rogers v. Cummings, 154 F. Supp. 663, 665 (D.
Conn. 1956).
72. It goes without saying that abusive practices just might implicate
the wrong persons. See Prina, Murder Won't Out, Washington Evening Star,
April 25, 1957, pp. 1-2. Abusive interrogations in the Grimes Sisters Murder
Case (Chicago), implicated several innocent persons.
73. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). The Supreme Court's test is
a subjective one. Each case hinges on its own facts and circumstances. See
Note, 33 Neb. L. Rev. 507 (1954). The initial determination of coerciveness is
to be made by the trial judge, who then may submit the issue to the jury.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
74. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
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until, in Malloy v. Hogan,7 5 the Court finally mustered enough
strength to hold squarely "that the Fourteenth Amendment guaran-
tee[s] the petitioner the protection of the Fifth Amendment's priv-
ilege against self-incrimination." In other words, "civilized standards"
includes the self-incrimination privilege itself. It immedately became
clear that, not to mention coercive practices, the mere obtaining of a
police station confession absent a warning about the self-incrimina-
tion privilege, is an illegal practice requiring the suppression of the
confession. 7 6
Supreme Court justices may be particularly sensitive, but no more
than perhaps behooves those august guardians of the law-protected
conscience of the nation. We at least like to think that what shocks
the conscience of Supreme Court justices also will shock the con-
science of the citizens of a civilized nation so that there is, perhaps,
a community feeling of civilized standards. If that be so, it would
follow that a police force which deviates from these standards puts
itself outside the community, isolates itself, does not command the
respect of the community and thus cannot count on that maximum of
citizen cooperation which is absolutely essential for effective police
work. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover recognized the point when he recently pro-
claimed that "police success in solving crimes . . .will depend to a
large extent upon the alertness, cooperativeness, and general assist-
ance rendered to the police by citizens."' 77 It stands to reason that,
rather than making for greater effectiveness, uncivilized interrogation
methods will actually decrease police efficiency in the suppression of
crime.
Apart from these disadvantages of the "less refined method" of
interrogation, is it at all clear that "many" cases cannot be solved
otherwise than by thus extracting confessions? A nervous police
officer may make his arrest too early, when wild suspicion has not yet
jelled to the standard of probable cause of the suspect's commission of
a crime. Under these circumstances the officer may have to question
his suspect in order to fathom his mind. But an experienced police
officer stalks his prey long enough so that he can prove his case very
75. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
76. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
77. UNIFORM CRIME REPoRTs-1961, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 13
(1962). The British have come to the same conclusion: "The Royal Commission
ended its observations on misbehavior by the police by saying: 'For it cannot
be too strongly emphasized that a police force in which dishonesty of any kind
is connived at cannot hope for long to retain the confidence of the public. In
this lies a double danger. Not only that their position may be abused to achieve
the conviction of a man who is in fact innocent, but also that juries will no longer
trust them enough to convict the guilty'." Du Cann, Police Evidence I, 6 (2)
The Lawyer 1, 7, 12 (1963).
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much without the suspect's personal and knowing participation in
the rendering of the proof.
What has been the actual experience with the increasing court
restrictions upon the "less refined methods" of police practice of
which abusive questioning is but one? Has law enforcement in our
great republic broken down? Have police officers been so severely
demoralized by the restrictions as no longer to be concerned about
effective law enforcement? There are no reliable criteria by which
to answer these questions. But we have very little if any evidence to
the effect that greater lawfulness on the part of the police-the re-
sult of greater restrictions imposed upon them-has made for greater
lawlessness outside the police, i.e., in the community, whose freedoms
were increased. Mr. Hoover reported for the year 1961 that "police
clearances of the more vicious crimes against the person are high....
During 1961, police effectiveness in clearing crimes increased 2 per-
cent." 7 8 Both the District of Columbia 7 9 and California8 0 had ex-
cellent results with the introduction of civilized standards in question-
ing, particularly the outlawing of prolonged detention for interroga-
tion. This is the crux of the matter: as seems to be the statistically
ascertainable result and as a priori emotional reasoning seems to
affirm, effective law enforcement is not inconsistent with greater
freedom of the individual. To the contrary, where, in the name of
more effective law enforcement, individual liberty is curtailed, the
effectiveness of law enforcement itself seems to be curtailed.
On this issue, then, the civil libertarians clearly have the better of
the argument and at least their most sophisticated spokesmen have
generally succeeded in transcending the emotional approach by
countering the demands of the law enforcement conservatives with
rational arguments. 8 '
CRIMINOLOGY:
THE ISSUE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In using the controversy about capital punishment as the criminologi-
cal test issue in my examination of the rationality of liberal and con-
servative argumentations, I may well be charged with setting up a
78. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTs-1961, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1962).
This statistical claim, however, is not very reliable. See Wolfgang, Uniform
Crime Reports: A Critical Appraisal, 111 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 708, 731-732 (1963).
79. Clayton, The Mallory Rule No Longer Panics the Police, Washington
Post-Outlook, June 14, 1959, p. E 1.
80. See the statements in Elkins v .United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
81. Besides Weisberg, supra note 62, see Barth, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY, ch. iv
(1961).
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straw man for a title bout. While a century ago it was easy to quote
many reputable writers and scholars as favoring capital punishment
for the good of society, today it is not easy to round up more than
half a dozen.8 2 Among the lower and tactical echelon of law en-
forcers,8 3 however, most still hold the view that the effective ad-
ministration of justice requires the threat of capital punishment
against murder, treason and, in some states, crimes like rape, armed
robbery, arson, narcotics transactions and others., 4 These conserva-
tives of law enforcement, supported by a very small number of out-
spoken criminal judges S 5 and an infinitesimally small number of
prison administrators,8 6 believe primarily in the deterrent effect of
capital punishment. A few may, at least partially, rely on the retribu-
tion argument which finds biblical support and some Roman Catholic
and fundamentalist-conservative backing.8 7 To call this the conserva-
tive position seems eminently justified, especially since all political
libertarians take the opposing view.
The liberals can easily dispose of the deterrence argument. This
nation's leading criminological statistician has conclusively shown
that no statistical evidence proves capital punishment to be a more
effective deterrent than other available deterrent sanctions.8 8 Oppos-
ing statistics do not make the slightest dent in the statistical armor s 9
so that only one other argument in favor of deterrence remains. Dr.
82. The only truly outstanding American intellectual who, to my knowl-
edge, had the courage to print an article favoring capital punishment is Pro-
fessor Jacques Barzun of Columbia University. See Barzun, In Favor of Capital
Punishment, 31 Am. Scholar 181 (1962). After critics got through with him,
there remained preciously little of his position. See Controversy: Mr. Barzun
and Capital Punishment, 31 Am. Scholar 436 (1962). But three of the six com-
ments reproduced in the American Scholar endorsed Professor Barzun's position,
for his own reasons. Morris, supra at 443; Morley, supra at 446; Allen, supra
at 477.
83. But see quote in Weiss, WHY I FAVOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1 (1961).
J. Edgar Hoover favors capital punishment as well.
84. But more are switching after intellectual reflection: see Symposium
on Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y.L.F. 247, passim (1961), esp. Herman, 266-269.
85. For example, Judge Samuel A. Weiss, of Pittsburgh-see Weiss, op.
cit. supra note 83; Judge Leibowitz, of Brooklyn-see Symposium on Capital
Punishment, 7 N.Y.L.F. 247, 289-296 (1961).
86. For example, Warden Denno. See Leibowitz, supra note 85, at 290.
Most prison wardens and correctional personnel are opposed to capital punish-
ment, e.g. Duffy, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN (1962); Lawes, MEET THE MURDERER
(1940); Lawes, 20,000 YEARS IN SING SING (1932); Mattick, THE UNEXAMINED
DEATH (1963).
87. See Weiss, op. cit. supra note 83, at 5-7; Hagarty, Capital Punishment
Should Be Retained, 3 Can. B.J. 42 (1960).
88. Sellin, THE DEATH PENALTY (American Law Institute, 1959).
89. Weiss, op. cit. supra note 83, at 4; Leibowitz, supra note 85, at 295.
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Wertham, an opponent of capital punishment (and a conservative on
the capacity issue), put the point this way on the basis of his own
clinical experience:
... [A]t the height of depression ... young holdup men...
thought this was the most clean-cut crime and they got a
gun and held up a man for some money .... [V] ery few of
them committed murder and I found out from them that
what really deterred them, very definitely, was the death
penalty. 90
This evidence is at best inconclusive. Would the threat of life im-
prisonment have deterred this statistically insignificant sampling?
Would greater certainty of detection have deterred them? A recent
New Hampshire case gives us a startling example of the thought
processes of gang murderers. A Rhode Island gang decided to dis-
pose of a Rhode Island underworld adversary. Oddly enough, they
did not execute the adversary in Rhode Island which has abolished
capital punishment, but they waited until the victim was on a short
business trip to capital-punishment New Hampshire and disposed of
him there. 9 1 A high-ranking New Hampshire law enforcement officer
commented: "It is my impression that the murder was committed in
New Hampshire because the murderers in their provincial way
thought they might get away with it in a state protected by 'hick
cops'."'9 2 And if there really are some few murderers who can be
deterred only by the threat of capital punishment, might not the
number of their murders be more than offset by those who kill only
because they want to die? 9 3 For those who need a more dramatic
proof of the false security into which belief in the superior deter-
rence of capital punishment inveigles humanity, Sidney Hook, the
libertarian philosopher, had this reminder:
90. Wertham, Symposium on Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y.L.F. 283, 286-7
(1961).
91. State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 175 A.2d 814 (1961).
92. Letter of December 18, 1962, on file with author.
93. E.g., People v. Wood, 12 N.Y.2d 69 (1962). Wood was a schizophrenic
who attacked all who sought to save his life from the electric chair. See also
Counsel for the Doomed, Newsweek, March 25, 1963, pp. 36-37; Wood proclaimed:
"I really want to 'ride the lightening'," Letter from Fred Wood to M. Jacobson,
Esq., March 19, 1963. (On file, N.Y.U. School of Law).
A recent Massachusetts murderer addressed the jury in these terms:
"It is my opinion that any decision other than guilty . . . of murder in the
first degree, with no recommendation for leniency, is a miscarriage of justice."
Commonwealth v. Chester, 150 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1958).
Another Massachusetts murderer, Jim Cooper, hanged himself when he
heard that the Governor of Massachusetts was about to commute his sentence.
Wiseman, Psychiatry and Law Use and Abuse of Psychiatry in a Murder 'ase,
118 Am. J. Psych. 289 (1961).
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Ladies and Gentlemen, do you really think that the execu-
tion of the last batch of Nazi murderers will have any in-
fluence upon totalitarian fanatics in the future? Right now
in the Soviet Union, in Cuba, in China, and in other dicta-
torial countries where freedom has been extinguished, thou-
sands of people are being executed or worked to death in
mines and camps. Are present-day dictators deterred by the
mere destruction of Nazi criminals ?94
But the dramatic clash between liberals and conservatives does
not occur on the ground of deterrence or other rational considera-
tions. The real encounter is on retribution. The issue is relatively
narrow: the liberals do not oppose the taking of life under all cir-
cumstances (some pacifists do), for they would admit homicide in
genuine self-defense. The conservatives do not demand capital
punishment solely in retribution, but they do regard it as the ethical
thing to reward him with death who by taking life "has forfeited his
God-given right to live." 9 5 While this, unquestionably, was a general
attitude among men in the Middle Ages and in antiquity, 96 attitudes
have been changing.9 7 A prosecutor reported: "I believe that juries
are returning more and more often with verdicts of murder with
recommendations." 9 8 It is becoming increasingly difficult to find
jurors for murder trials willing to impose capital punishment. 9 9 The
American execution rate has declined from 199 in 1935 to 42 in 1961,
47 in 1962, and only 21 in 1963.10 0 A Gallup poll indicates that while
in 1953, 68 percent of the population favored capital punishment for
murder, in 1961 the number was down to 51 percent.' 0 ' For England
it was said that capital punishment "no longer accords with the degree
of civilization to which we feel we have attained."' 02 This is the real
94. Hook, Symposium on Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y.L.F. 296, 298 (1961).
95. Bishop Riley, as quoted in Weiss, op. cit. supra note 83, at 6. See also
Allen, supra note 82, at 447.
96. Which does not make it a "right" argument! For a refutation of
the argument of religious retribution see MacDonald, Psychiatry and Colorado
Criminal Law, 36 Dicta 74, 79-80 (1959). - I shall leave undiscussed the
possible use of capital punishment in contemporary primitive societies which
have not progressed significantly beyond the talionic stage of evolution.
97. See McCafferty, Major Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment,
1 (2) Crim. L.Q. 9 (1963).
98. Herman, supra note 84, at 266, 269.
99. E.g., Wolak Jury Still at Six-100 Questioned Without Adding One
Panel Member, Newark Evening News, April 10, 1959, p. 37, col. 1.
100. U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 32 NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, Ex-
ECUTIONS 1962 (1963), 34 Id., May 1964.
101. Weiss, op. cit. 8upra note 83, at 7.
102. Gardiner, Criminal Law: Capital Punishment in Britain, 45 A.B.A.J.
259, 261 (1959).
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point: our physical and intellectual evolution was accompanied by a
delayed emotional evolution. In the Middle Ages, at the time of the
great pestilence, death was regarded as commonplace. Skeletons and
death were members of everybody's family. As the wood-cuts of
Dilrer document, skulls and bones, and death and misery determined
every phase of life. The pestilence went, but the macabre outlook on
life and death continued through the era of the public executions of
tens of thousands, until the enlightened spirits of the 18th and 19th
centuries helped change man's outlook on life and death. Unfortu-
nately, long after the age of enlightenment, the skull and the cross-
bones were to return to man who had defeated death and misery long
ago by his own exertion. Once again death became a member of the
family. The Apocalypse had returned to all of Europe. For a while
it was forgotten that the macabre spirit of the gallows, the gas
chamber and the electric chair simply does not fit into the age of free
and scientific man. 1 0 3 Man's ingenuity had defeated death where
heretofore it was regarded as invincible, whether it be in the sick
bed or in the gas chamber. It remains for government to give its offi-
cial stamp of approval.
But the libertarian point of view cannot be supported, as some at-
tempt to do,1 0 4 on the sole basis of its inhumanitarian selectivity.
It is true that "in the 3,666 total [of executions] for 1930-1959,
1,972 of those executed were Negroes, compared with 1,653 whites and
41 other groupings.''105 It is also true that most of those executed
were poor and friendless, with gangland executioners notably under-
represented.' 0 6 The short answer to this is that criminal procedure
may need reform above all else. And here we close the circle of
argumentation, for it is at this point that the conservatives chime in
by arguing that all would be well if capital punishment were indis-
criminately applied to truly all murders.' 0 7 But what if we do hang,
103. Barnes and Teeters, Criminologists of the extremist social-defense
point of view, who "do not advance any of the sentimental objections to capital
punishment," and who are prepared, if necessary, to endorse "the practice of
exterminating useless, defective, and dangerous human types," find it hard
to concede that "a person of any reasonable cultivation . . . can defend the
perpetuation of this relic of human barbarism." Barnes & Teeters, NEW
HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 434, 435 (1950 rev. ed.).
104. For example, Judge Breitel. See Wechsler, Symposium on Capital
Punishment, 7 N.Y.L.F. at 259 (1961). See also Redlich and Rubin, Brief
Urging the Abolition of Capital Punishment in New York State, Submitted
by the New York Committee to Abolish Capital Punishment 25-36 (1962).
105. Professor Morris' reply to Professor Barzun, supra note 82, at 444.
See also Morris, Thoughts on Capital Punishment, 35 Wash. L. Rev. 335 n. 41
(1960).
106. Redlich and Rubin, supra note 104, at 25-37.
107. Liebowitz, supra note 85, at 294-295.
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gas or electrocute 10,000 murderers annually? I am not even think-
ing of the unavoidable bungling of executions' 08 or of the errone-
ously executed convicts.10 9 I am thinking of the dearly purchased
illusion of greater safety of his liberty which man thus buys for him-
self at the expense of this very liberty, an expense which takes its
toll from his every phase of life. His daily newspapers perpetuate
the sensationalist morbidity of the cat-and-mouse play with human
life; his legal system is incapable of maximum effectiveness 01 and
virtually immune to advancement because of technicalities and re-
strictions created centuries ago solely because hecatombs of gallows
then dotted the countryside."' Ultimately, the gas chambers and
electric chairs suppress man's spiritual freedom and tie him to his
talionic past' 12 and the utilitarian philosophy of the age when man
knew little of his capacities. In the mechanical sciences the word im-
possible has been overcome. It is paradoxical and saddening that the
conservatives' last remaining argument for capital punishment, that
of ethical retribution, would rest on the semblance of the very same
spiritual ethics which also teach the doctrine of redemption. After
the behavioral sciences have proved the criminological monster of
108. One of my early charges met that unhappy fate. See Mueller, The
Failure of Concepts of Criminal Theory in Judging the Psychopathic Offender,
Archives of Crim. Psychodyn., Spec. Psychopathy Issue 558 (1961).
109. For a current case, detected in time, see Phelan, Innocent's Grim
Ordeal, Saturday Evening Post, Feb. 2, 1963, p. 63; see also Colegrove, We
Found Justice Is Blind in Both Eyes, N.Y. World Tele. & Sun, July 1, 1963,
p. 16, cols. 1-4; Borchard, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); Pollak, The Errors
of Justice, 284 Annals 115 (1952); Gardiner, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT
(1952); Frank, NOT GUILTY (1957). See also Barnett v. Commonwealth, 348
S.W.2d 834 (Ky. 1961). See 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 608 (1962); Pieski & Mueller
Criminal Law and Administration, 1962 Ann. Survey Am. L. 68, 98 (1963).
See also Lawes, Capital Punishment, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY 43, 45
(Branham & Kutash, eds., 1949).
110. See the sections of The Death Penalty and Law Enforcement, Ef-
fect of the Death Penalty on Prosecution, and Coercive Effect of the Death
Penalty, in Redlich and Rubin, supra note 104, at 11-16. See also Glueck (letter),
quoted in McCafferty, supra note 97, at 22.
111. Compare Koestler, REFLECTION ON HANGING 7-8 (1957), with Hall,
THEFr, LAW AND SOCIETY 118 (1935); "What in fact happened was that, be-
ginning in the early part of the eighteenth century, the persons lay and of-
ficials, who administered the criminal law, invested and indulged in practices
which almost nullified the capital penalty in most non-chargeable felonies . . .
The judges developed many technicalities by which they effectively sub-
merged statutory provisions of capital penalization." These technicalities are
still conplicating our law, though the reasons for their existence have largely
disappeared.
112. On the relation between capital punishment and the existence of
lynch, justice, see Sellin, op. cit. supra note 88, at 79-80; Mattick, THE UN-
EXAMINED DEATH 25-27 (1963).
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the born criminal to be a scientific monstrosity,1 3 and after the
demonstration that, through earthly penitence and rehabilitative ef-
forts, convicts are capable of redemption1. 4 even on earth, nothing
is left of the conservatives' argument for the retention of capital
punishment.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
These little surveys may have demonstrated that those styled as
liberals have not consistently taken libertarian positions. By the same
token, those styled as conservatives-and their class is less clearly
identifiable-have not consistently taken conservative (here meaning
stringent and traditional) positions. There may be two basic reasons
for these inconsistencies. First, positions are taken initially for emo-
tional rather than rational reasons, and ratio enters the picture only
after the position has been adopted and to the extent that it supports
such a siding. But there may be a more significant reason: our society
has lost sight of the real goals of liberalism, or perhaps of the mean-
ing of that term. Surmising that liberals and conservatives would
agree on the goal value of a society of maximum human freedom, I
have in this paper defined liberalism primarily in terms of its ap-
proach to the accomplishment of the goal values, namely, with a
minimum of police power pressure upon, or governmental regulation
of, the primeval individual freedom of each member of society and,
thus, with the last exertion of effort. This is indeed a liberal as much
as a utilitarian approach. In these terms it emerged that the styled
liberals scored only 50% liberal, namely, on the issues of freedom
from undue police power in the questioning of suspects, and on the
issue of capital punishment. Both are issues overtly appealing to the
libertarian sentiments. On the other hand, conservatives choose the
overtly conservative but covertly (and long range) liberal positions
on the issues of the capacity of criminal defendants and the prolifera-
tion of crimes through economic regulatory penal law."] 5 We are
113. In lieu of many learned tomes, merely see George Bernard Shaw,
THE CRIME OF IMPRISONMENT 105-114 (1946).
114. Criminals spared from death who are released after a term of years
have better records on the whole than released prisoners in general. Wechsler,
supra note 104, at 254; Sellin, op. cit. supra note 88, at 69-79; and see Redlich
and Rubin, supra note 104, at 24-25.
115. Mr. Justice Douglas, an outstanding liberal, recently had occasion
to complain about the very same inconsistency: "Our representatives abroad
take their overseas posts fully appraised of the free enterprise system and
the American market system. But bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, habeas
corpus, the Fifth Amendment, freedom of expression, separation of church
and state - these are seldom conversation pieces in our embassies and lega-
tions. Yet it is around those subjects and allied constitutional topics that
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driven to the unhappy conclusion that emotion and the pursuit of
short term goals are likely to be greater determinants in the future
policy of American criminal law than reason and the pursuit of long
term goals. This constitutes a significant danger for effective penal
law administration which should be ever mindful of the ultimate goal
of a maximum of man's freedom in all short term policy decisions, for
such is not only our national credo, but also the utilitarian prefer-
ence. The academician who thinks in terms of long range goals is
clearly handicapped in his efforts, since he must take issue with short
range determined positions among the popular policy makers. At
least half the time he seems opposed to the popular issues and, for
the remainder, he supports the popular position primarily for reasons
other than those held by the popular policy makers. At best, this
puts the academician in an unenviable position, quite apart from the
fact that his stand will constantly be mislabelled or, what is worse,
that he will be charged with the very inconsistency of which styled
liberals and conservatives are constantly guilty. 1 1 6
Finally, it is clear that neither side has a monopoly on the better
argument. Even the academician cannot be totally sure of his posi-
tion for, as yet, he is operating in the sphere of the vast unknown in
which, lacking heuristic validation, his arguments rest largely on
reasoning from principles. But such reasoning does already point to
the possibility that the supposed need of weighting the scales in favor
of or against freedom or restraint is largely imaginary, for there
seems to be a position at which the scales are normally in balance.
Every artifical weighting on either side requires an artifical counter-
weighting on the other-until the scales no longer can stand the
stress.
American criminal law has a conscience. This conscience may have
ethics as a mother, religion as a father and necessity as a midwife.
The courts may be its guardian ad litem, but it is in the primary
custody of the academicians of criminal law. We need not worry
about these custodians. They seem to understand their task well.
Their often emotional decisions may be erroneous from the long
range point of view, but they were made sincerely. Let us only hope
that sincerity and wisdom will combine for a beneficial custodianship
of truly liberal dimensions.
the fundamental differences between the Free Society and dictatorships (to the
left and to the right) are to be found." Douglas, The Bill of Rights is Not
Enough, THE GREAT RIGHTS 115, 153 (Cahn ed. 1963).
116. One such short-range determined emotional labelling occurred when
Senator Eastland charged justices of the Supreme Court as having consistently
voted "pro-Communist." For an effective refutation see Dorsen, Senator East-
land's Attack on the United States supreme Court: An Analysis and Response,
111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 693 (1963).
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